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Cable reference id: #07SHANGHAI771

“All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities.” — “Refus Global“, Paul-Émile Borduas

Hide header S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 SHANGHAI 000771 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP/CM, INR/B AND INR/EAP STATE PASS USTR FOR STRATFORD, WINTER, MCCARTIN, WINELAND, READE TREAS FOR OASIA - DOHNER/CUSHMAN, WRIGHT USDOC FOR ITA/MAC - A/DAS MELCHER, MCQUEEN NSC FOR WILDER E.O. 12958: DECL: MR, X1 TAGS: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], PINR [Intelligence], PREL [External Political Relations], ECON [Economic Conditions], CH [China (Mainland)] SUBJECT: EAST CHINA CONTACTS ON LEADERSHIP CHANGES REF: SHANGHAI 714 SHANGHAI 00000771 001.4 OF 006 CLASSIFIED BY: Simon Schuchat, Deputy Principal Officer, U.S. Consulate General, Shanghai, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) ¶1. (S) Summary: East China academic and business contacts who closely follow national political developments say that the size and selection of the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) at the 17th Party Congress in October reflected institutionalization of power and power transfer. Vice President Zeng's insistence on maintaining party stability through application of the "Seven Up, Eight Down" rule precluded removal of PBSC members Jia Qinglin and Li Changchun, though President Hu would have preferred their retirement. Former Shanghai Party Secretary Chen Liangyu's greatest sin was not corruption but challenging the authority of the center. Xi Jinping's position on the PBSC ahead of Li Keqiang's is attributed to an excellent and clean performance record, having offended the fewest Party officials, and fortuitous timing. Former President Jiang Zemin had also lobbied for Xi Jingping's elevation in preference to Li Keqiang because of Jiang's concerns for his family's future and his own political legacy. The Jiang faction allegedly had a role in orchestrating the sudden summer downfall of Finance Minister Jin Renqing, a Hu supporter, in retaliation for the dismissal of Chen Liangyu. Our contacts also offered their versions of several provincial and municipal Party leadership changes and comments on the health of PBSC members. End summary. --------------------------------------------- -------- Stability Trumps Personal Power at the Party Congress --------------------------------------------- -------- ¶2. (C) During a November 9 discussion, Carlyle Group Chief China Representative Luo Yi said that despite all of the pre-Party Congress rumors of personnel changes in the PBSC, the Party leadership opted for more institutionalization of power and power transfer. Luo said, for instance, that Vice President Zeng Qinghong could have stayed on the PBSC if he had opted to; that President Hu would have been unable to force him out if he had truly desired to stay. However, Zeng was interested in maintaining the stability of Party rule. At the 2002 16th Party Congress, then-President Jiang Zemin had arbitrarily set the so-called "Seven Up, Eight Down" rule to force rival Li Ruihuan from the body. The rule stipulated that PBSC members who had reached the age of 68 be forced to retire, while those who were 67 could be reelected to another five-year PBSC term. ¶3. (C) Luo said that rather than fiddle with the age limit again and confirm people's suspicions that the 16th Party Congress had been a Jiang power grab, Zeng, who had already reached 68, decided that it would be best if the age limit--however arbitrary it might be--was rigidly adhered to. To that end, Zeng insisted that Jia Qinglin and Li Changchun be allowed to remain on the PBSC, despite Hu's desire to sack them, because they have not yet reached the age of 68. To fire them, Zeng argued, would send the wrong message to the Party and point to factional cleavages within the Party. Zeng's stability argument is the only reason Jia is still in place, Luo said. ¶4. (C) Luo said Zeng had also pushed hard for more inclusion of members of the princeling party among the top ranks, including Xi Jinping and Shanghai Party Secretary Yu Zhengsheng. These people Zeng believes are more inclined to preserve the party's status quo. Zeng did not think much of the princeling ties of Organization Department head Li Yuanchao and Politburo member Liu Yandong, whom Zeng considers more aligned with the Communist Youth League faction. --------------------------------------------- --- Chen Liangyu: The Exception that Proves the Rule --------------------------------------------- --- ¶5. (C) Luo noted that the exception to the age rule had been Shanghai Party Secretary Chen Liangyu, who had not reached the mandatory retirement age for Politburo members when he was sacked. While Chen was much cleaner than Jia Qinglin, his main problem was that he had openly rebelled against the Party Secretary. Luo said that in China you can be as corrupt as you SIPDIS want and go your own way on local policy as long as you pay the proper lip service to the center. Chen, however, had openly insulted Hu on a number of occasions and had made no effort to SHANGHAI 00000771 002.4 OF 006 hide his disdain for central policy and central control. Given Chen's age, he would have been virtually guaranteed a position on the PBSC and would have been one of the strongest contenders to replace Hu as Party Secretary--something Hu could not stomach. Luo joked: "It's a party after all. Don't crash it or insult the host!" ¶6. (C) On November 14 JPMorgan Greater China Vice Chairman Andrew Zhang said corruption is not an issue unless you fall out of political favor. PBSC members do not see it as their responsibility to do away with all corruption in the Party, rather to protect the right people and prosecute those who challenge them. Zhang said Chen Liangyu has not yet been sentenced because it has been difficult to find an appropriate sentence for him. Chen had not ended up with much in his own pockets from the Shanghai social security fund scandal. Chen's brother had been the biggest beneficiary and he had already committed suicide. Chen's hair has all turned grey and his teeth have all fallen out during his detention, Zhang said. ------------- A Wash For Hu ------------- ¶7. (C) Luo described the results of the 17th Party Congress as a "wash" for Hu Jintao. Although he was able to promote his protege Li Keqiang to the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC), he was unable to prevent Xi Jinping from likewise gaining a promotion. Moreover, Hu failed to get Li promoted ahead of Xi, making Xi the leading candidate to take over Hu's position as Party Secretary. Zhang said that while Hu did not emerge as the clear winner at the 17th Party Congress, he is well positioned for the 2012 Party Congress. Of particular importance, Zhang said, Hu now controls the Organization Department--which recommends candidates for promotion--through his protege Li Yuanchao. --------------------------------------------- -- Xi Jinping and Li Yuanchao--Clash of the Titans --------------------------------------------- -- ¶8. (C) During a November 26 discussion, Jiaotong University International and Public Affairs Dean Hu Wei said that Li Keqiang's taking second place to Xi does not mean that Li is out of the running for the job. Hu said the two men will be competing for Hu Jintao's job up through the next Party Congress. Nanjing Party School (NPS) Standing Committee member and Vice Director He Jiaquan on November 27 likewise assessed that it is not a foregone conclusion that Xi will replace Hu Jintao. Vice Director He said that "five years is quite a long time." It is possible that at some point during their current tenure, Xi and Li Keqiang might switch positions. During a November 27 discussion, Nanjing University Professor Gu Su said that Vice President Zeng's portfolio will be split three ways, adding to the uncertainty of who would succeed Hu. While Xi will have the title of Vice President with responsibility for the Hong Kong and Taiwan portfolios, Li Changchun will be made President of the Central Party School, and He Guoqiang will be given oversight of the Organization Department. ¶9. (S) Jiaotong's Professor Hu attributed Xi's surpassing Li Keqiang in the PBSC ranking to his charm. Prior to the Party Congress, there had been an internal poll of the party leadership on their views of different candidates for top-level jobs. Xi scored higher than Li Keqiang, making it impossible for Hu Jintao to push Li Keqiang's promotion through. Those polled consider Xi more polished and able to build bridges between leaders. Li Keqiang, on the other hand, has offended more officials on his way up the ladder. (Comment: Xi's status as a princeling would likely have also given him a serious advantage in building bridges, allowing him face time with a wide range of party leaders throughout his career. End comment.) ¶10. (C) NPS Vice Director He attributed Xi Jinping's rapid rise from Shanghai Party Secretary to heir apparent in Beijing foremost to lucky timing. Xi's seven-month term in Shanghai was most noticeable for the absence of new turmoil and absence of an economic downturn following former Party Secretary Chen Liangyu's removal late in 2006. He said Xi's broad acceptance throughout the Party is founded on his rich prior experience, from the district and county levels to party secretary-ships at the Provincial and centrally administered municipal (Shanghai) level. Vice Director He said a Chinese aphorism has much appeal SHANGHAI 00000771 003.4 OF 006 to this day and touched on Xi's rise, namely, that a supreme leader should come from the county level and a general should come from the common people. Party officials throughout the nation were aware of Xi's excellent performance record, beginning from the local level. ¶11. (C) JPMorgan's Andrew Zhang suggested to Congenoffs that Xi's proactive accomplishments in Shanghai were just two: attending a Municipal Party Congress meeting and seeing the already planned Special Olympics through to a successful conclusion in October. However, Xi enjoyed a reputation as a "Mr. Clean"--having on at least one occasion refused a bribe of 100,000 RMB during his time in Xiamen. Xi has no need to risk taking bribes given the amount of money his wife, a famous singer, pulls in. Xi is very bland--the most colorless of the candidates--and was therefore the easiest compromise. ¶12. (S//NF) As a side note, Luo said that while Li Keqiang is, in fact, Hu Jintao's protege, he also enjoys excellent relations with number two on the PBSC, legislative chief Wu Bangguo. Luo had asked that question point blank to Wu Bangguo's son-in-law during a recent meeting. (Note: Luo recently accepted an offer from Wu Bangguo's son-in-law (a former Merrill Lynch executive) to jointly form a private equity fund with a hedge fund manager of Chinese descent currently working for the Soros fund, and Li Keqiang's son, who is currently studying in university. End note.) ----------------------------------------- Influence of Jiang on Party Deliberations ----------------------------------------- ¶13. (C) Nanjing University Professor Gu said that former President and former Party Secretary Jiang Zemin had also vehemently opposed Li Keqiang's appointment and had argued for Xi's appointment. Gu assessed that Jiang sees Xi with his princeling background as someone who will protect Jiang's interests. This is especially important to Jiang given that his elder son, Jiang Mianheng, has been blocked from rising to any greater heights within the leadership due to his recent bout with cancer. Gu said he had heard that Jiang Mianheng suffers from kidney cancer and has already had at least two operations--one in China and one abroad. ¶14. (C) Gu noted that although his younger son, Jiang Miankang, holds the rank of general (shaojiang) in the PLA's Nanjing Military Region--Gu said he deals with logistics--Jiang Zemin spent too much of his political capital in attempting to secure a political future for Jiang Mianheng, leaving Jiang Miankang likewise futureless. Gu said that in the Chinese political system, if you fail to get your people in place--proteges and/or family members--you have nothing: no protection for your family; no protection for yourself; no prestige; and no guarantees that your policy legacy will be protected. ¶15. (C) Gu said he has heard that Jiang Zemin is very upset these days, believing that he has lost a great deal of personal power and influence. He is also greatly upset that his family has no political prospects. As a result, he is playing more of a spoiler role than anything else these days. Jiang is taking his wrath out on Premier Wen Jiabao, whom Jiang hates for being close to the late disgraced Party Secretary Zhao Ziyang. Jiang is blaming Wen for all of China's current economic problems. Jiang's criticisms could lead to Wen's early retirement, which would be akin to Jiang shooting himself in the foot. If Wen steps down, Li Keqiang will likely take over for Wen, giving Li greater leverage to make the switch to Party Secretary in 2012. ¶16. (C) Jiaotong's Professor Hu Wei said that by official party regulation, Jiang Zemin maintains a role in top-level decision making. The regulation states that the retired Party Secretary must be consulted on all serious or contentious issues. He is given official protocol rank--number two, just behind the current Party Secretary--and has a right to weigh in on whatever issues he wants to speak on. This right given to Jiang is not based on Jiang's personal gravitas but by virtue of his past political status. Whoever succeeds Hu Jintao will likewise be required to extend the same privileges to Hu. Similarly, late paramount leader Deng Xiaoping was extended the same privileges by Jiang. --------------------- SHANGHAI 00000771 004.4 OF 006 Jiang's Tonic for Jin --------------------- ¶17. (S) Andrew Zhang noted that the sacking of Finance Minister Jin Renqing, a Hu Jintao protege, was Jiang Zemin's revenge for Hu's sacking of former Shanghai Party Secretary Chen Liangyu. Zhang described Jin as an honest official and a loyal husband. Jin worked his way up the chain, beginning his career as a rice rationer in Yunnan Province. He had maintained a spotless record throughout his career. Jin's wife developed an unspecified mental illness 13 years ago, and yet Jin remained faithful, going home to her every night. Jin only occasionally went out drinking with his male secretary. ¶18. (S) Zhang said that Jiang's people had attempted to put Jin in a compromising position with the woman he is accused of having an affair with, but that Jin had refused her advances. Failing to corrupt Jin, Jiang's associates attempted to have the woman seduce Jin's son. At the same time, they arranged a transfer of 500,000 RMB into Jin's son's bank account. By the time the son realized that there was a large sum of money of unknown origins in his account, the matter had already been turned over to the Ministry of Public Security for investigation. Minister Jin was told that if he did not resign his son would be prosecuted. Zhang said that Jin is not under house arrest but is working at a think tank in Beijing. Luo, however, said that Wu Bangguo's son-in-law told him that Jin did in fact have sexual relations with the woman in question and was under the so-called "shuang gui" restrictions. -------------------------------------- National and Ministerial-level Changes -------------------------------------- ¶19. (S) Andrew Zhang said that the lengthy time it took to resolve the personnel line-up--July to October--bodes ill for the leadership's ability to quickly resolve government leadership changes. He noted that it was difficult to find consensus on the party jobs and that it will be even harder to come to agreement on power sharing within the government. In contrast, Luo said that the major government positions have been basically decided, although some of the ministerial positions are still being debated. PBSC member Li Keqiang will be taking over the Executive Vice Premier slot. Guangdong Governor Zhang Dejiang will be transferring to Beijing to take up Wu Yi's trade portfolio as a vice premier. Beijing Mayor Wang Qishan will also be promoted to vice premier and will take up part of Zeng Peiyan's industry portfolio, which will be split. Liu Yandong will be replacing Chen Zhili as State Councilor in charge of science, education, and women's issues. During a November 27 discussion, Nanjing University Professor Gu Su said he had heard that Liu Yandong might take over Wu Yi's position, icluding the trade portfolio. ¶20. (C) Luo said he had heard three officials' names being bandied about for the job of National Development Reform Commission (NDRC) chairman: NDRC Vice Chairman Zhu Zhixin, NDRC Vice Chairman Chen Deming, and State Council Deputy Secretary General Zhang Ping. He noted that Zhang had served in the NDRC or its predecessor organizations (State Planning) before moving to the State Council. (Chen Deming's selection as the Commerce Minster-designate was announced in the final week of November. Earlier Chinese press reports and Luo speaking on November 9 had predicted that Jilin Party Secretary Wang Min would replace Bo Xilai as Minister of Commerce.) ¶21. (C) Zhang said that Li Changchun, a Jiang protege, will still continue to hold the Propaganda Portfolio on the PBSC. However, Li has been effectively sidelined and real power is being wielded by the Propaganda Minister, whom Zhang said is a Hu acolyte. Li is in place to safeguard Jiang's legacy. Zhang said he would not be surprised if Li suffered a heart attack or stroke before the next Party Congress. Luo noted that the current Propaganda Minister, Liu Yunshan, is also a Jiang protege. (Note: It is unclear if Zhang meant current Propaganda Minister Liu Yunshan or a Vice Minister underneath him. End note.) ------------------------------------------- Horse Trading in Shanghai and the Provinces ------------------------------------------- Shanghai SHANGHAI 00000771 005.4 OF 006 -------- ¶22. (C) Luo said that the domino effect of personnel changes will also be felt in the provincial changes as well. Luo believed Shanghai Mayor Han Zheng will be moving soon (Note: Luo had thought Han might transfer to Anhui as Party Secretary, although that job has recently been filled. End note.). Han will probably retire from his next post, if he avoids coming under arrest, Luo added jokingly. Shaanxi Governor Yuan Chunqing will likely replace Han as Shanghai Mayor. Luo said that the Central Government is trying to put Shanghai in its place by replacing both top jobs with outsiders--something many Shanghai observers did not think would ever happen. Andrew Zhang separately agreed that the Central Leadership is trying to teach Shanghai a lesson. Zhang believes Yu Zhengsheng will finish out his career as Shanghai Party Secretary, marking the first time in a long while that the top Shanghai post is not being filled by an up-and-comer. ¶23. (C) Zhang said that Mayor Han's career will effectively end when he leaves the Shanghai Mayoralty, whether at the early 2008 end of his current term or even if his Mayoral term is extended to serve and support the recently arrived Shanghai Party Secretary. Nanjing University Professor Gu Su told us on SIPDIS November 27 that he thought it likely that the new Party Secretary would require Mayor Han's service through the end of SIPDIS 2008. A Wenling, Zhejiang Party cadre emphasized to us on November 14 that the whole Party and whole nation had seen that Mayor Han was passed over - twice - for the Shanghai Party Secretary position. If Han is transferred to an economically SIPDIS lagging province to serve as provincial Party Secretary, others would think of it at best as a lateral move for someone coming from one of the senior-most leadership positions in cosmopolitan Shanghai, despite the move technically being a promotion. Zhang noted that bringing in an outsider for the top Shanghai slot and the current rumors of Han's departure are very disruptive to Shanghai's governance. The uncertainty of Shanghai's political standing is compounded by the fact that there is currently no heir-apparent for Han's job among the Shanghai Vice Mayors. Jiangsu ------- ¶24. (C) Luo said that former Jiangsu Provincial Governor Liang Baohua will finish his career in the next two to three years in his new role as Jiangsu Party Secretary. Backfilling for Liang, Nanjing Party Secretary and Organization Department head Li Yuanchao protege Luo Zhijun will be promoted to Jiangsu Governor. Luo Zhijun will also likely be in line to replace Liang as Jiangsu Party Secretary when Liang steps down. Chongqing --------- ¶25. (S) Luo predicted in our November 9 discussion that Minister of Commerce Bo Xilai's expected (and since announced) move to Chongqing to become Party Secretary will be his final career move. While Bo may serve two terms, he will not be promoted higher. Bo is not happy with his onward assignment. Jiaotong University Professor Hu Wei on November 26 repeated his Beijing contacts' comments that Bo had for several days been withdrawn following the decision on his onward assignment and that he had ceased his past pattern of incessant contacts with other domestic figures whose support he had so ardently courted in the leadup to the Party Congress. ¶26. (S) Nanjing's Professor Gu said Bo's move to Chongqing puts an ambitious, arrogant and widely disliked competitor for a top position in a trouble-filled position far from Beijing. Gu noted that Bo had been angling for promotion to Vice Premier. However, Premier Wen had argued against the promotion, citing the numerous lawsuits brought against Bo in Australia, Spain, Canada, England, the United States, and elsewhere by Falungong members. Wen successfully argued Bo's significant negative international exposure made him an inappropriate candidate to represent China at an even higher international level. Wen's arguments found fertile soil among officials who still harbor resentment against Bo for his treatment of his family--particularly his father--during the Cultural Revolution (1966-76). In order to make himself politically above reproach, Bo, at the time, had made a public statement denouncing his father and renouncing his kinship ties. Gu said that people value familial feelings above all else and many see Bo as a SHANGHAI 00000771 006.4 OF 006 "base traitor" who is "less than human" for his actions. ¶27. (C) Gu listed a litany of challenges facing the new Party leader in Chongqing: Chongqing is huge and beset with problems of air and water pollution, Three Gorges Dam resettlement and safety concerns, unemployment, pestilence and illness. Bo will surely have his hands full, and concerns about Three Gorges safety issues are rising. Should Bo prove his mettle and somehow overcome these challenges, he might yet be a contender five years from now. Gu also noted that Bo's transfer to Chongqing enabled President Hu to move prior Chongqing Party Secretary Wang Yang, a Hu supporter, to a better position before SIPDIS any disasters befall Chongqing and the Party leadership there. ----------------------- Only the Good Die Young ----------------------- ¶28. (S) Luo said that most leaders, when they retire, want to stay retired. He pointed to Zhu Rongji, Li Ruihuan, and others (mostly ministers), noting that while they are in power, top leaders work extremely hard, often long into the night. They now retire before the age of 68, healthy and vigorous and wanting to enjoy their remaining years with their families, feeling that is a right they have earned. For instance, Vice Premier Zeng Peiyan's fondest wish is to be able to spend a few hours a day with his grandson. (Note: Luo is friends with Zeng Peiyan's son and attributed his insights into Zeng's mind to that relationship. End note.) ¶29. (S) While most leaders are happy to retire, that does not mean they cease enjoying exercise of authority, Luo said. People like Jiang Zemin are used to holding a great deal of influence. While they do not want to go back into the office for long days on the job, they do enjoy remaining influential in politics behind the scenes. Luo speculated that Zeng Qinghong will not be able to completely remove himself from politics, despite his willingness to retire. ¶30. (S) On a slightly related point, Luo confirmed that Wu Bangguo recently underwent surgery and treatment for lung cancer. The cancer was detected in its early stages and Wu is expected to make a complete recovery. Li Changchun had also been treated for liver cancer. Luo said that it was unprecedented to have three sitting PBSC members--Huang Ju died of cancer earlier in 2007--be diagnosed with cancer at the same time and joked that it must be something in the Beijing air. (Note: Wu Bangguo's cancer came to Luo's attention during business discussions with Wu's son-in-law, he said. End note.)JARRETT